We examined recent volcanic cloud events in the Western Pacific and Indonesian area, to validate the performance of remote sensing techniques used to support the International Airways Volcano Watch (IAVW). Five events were considered, during which eruptions from eight volcanoes injected ash into the upper troposphere or lower stratosphere. For one of the eruptions, at Miyakejima, Japan, at least five aircraft encountered volcanic ash clouds, and the cost to three operators alone exceeded US $12,000,000 in aircraft repairs, diversions, and lost operating time. We performed 'reverse' absorption and 'pattern analysis' using GMS-5/VISSR, MODIS and AVHRR data, and we examined TOMS SO 2 and Aerosol Index data, surface-based observations, pilot reports, and dispersion model output. Our results verify that the introduction of 'reverse' absorption using the geostationary GMS-5 platform significantly enhanced our capacity to monitor volcanic ash clouds in the region. In one case, we tracked an eruption cloud for approximately 80 hours. The primary impediment to remote monitoring is the presence of overlying cloud, or substantial amounts of ice within the volcanic clouds. TOMS data showed success in identifying volcanic clouds during these conditions, but was limited by the infrequency of observations. More effective future operation of the IAVW relies on developing complementary methods of volcanic cloud remote sensing, and greatly increasing the amount and quality of available surface and air observations, including observations of precursor activity. An understanding of the likely future limitations of remote sensing techniques will aid in the refining of IAVW procedures.
provided directly to airlines and are in the public domain (ICAO, 2000) . The standards and procedures of the IAVW are set by ICAO and are negotiated between all IAVW participants, using informal and formal regional and international forums, and ultimately through the guidance of the IAVW Operations Group, which reports to the Air Navigation Commission (ICAO, 2003) .
The IAVW in the western 'Ring of Fire'.
Much of the world's volcanic activity is concentrated around the so-called 'Ring of Fire', which extends approximately around the perimeter of the Pacific Ocean. The western 'Ring of Fire', which includes Kamchatka (Russia), Japan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Papua New Guinea, has had many of the world's major historical eruptions, and the majority of documented aircraft encounters with volcanic ash (ICAO, 2001 ). Many of these encounters are examined in Johnson & Casadevall (1994) , and Casadevall et al. (1996) . The VAACs responsible for monitoring this region are Tokyo (Japan), Darwin (Australia), Wellington (New Zealand), Washington DC (USA), and Anchorage (USA).
These four countries have maintained robust consultative processes during the establishment of the IAVW in the region, involving volcanological agencies, airlines, aviation authorities, and meteorological services (eg Potts & Whitby, 1994) . Recent discussion in the literature , Simpson et al., 2001 has, however, highlighted the need for improved communication between the 'operational' and 'research' communities regionally and worldwide.
Scientific and operational issues
A number of issues have been discussed in the recent literature. The complexities of volcanic cloud monitoring make it difficult to separate scientific from operational issues, or to treat all the possible issues fairly in one paper, but they include:
The concentration of ash required to measurably damage an aircraft.
In promoting the IAVW, responsible aviation operators have developed the concept of 'complete avoidance' of volcanic ash (Campbell, 1994; Cantor, 1998; Salinas, 1999; Rossier, 2002) . In reality, volcanic ash can be assumed to suffuse the entire atmosphere to some degree, and there is no definition of a 'safe' level of exposure (ICAO, 2000; FAA, 2001) . There is evidence that some airlines are prepared to fly during situations where others will not; for example, in the cases of the Rinjani (Lombok, Indonesia) eruption of 1994 , and the 2002 Ruang (Sangihe Islands, Indonesia) eruption presented in this paper, Darwin VAAC meteorologists learned of specific cases where some airlines chose to fly through areas that contained detected ash cloud.
This issue has been a long-standing difficulty, but it came into prominence after the encounter of a NASA DC-8 research aircraft with a volcanic cloud from Hekla (Iceland) in 2000 (Grindle & Burcham, 2002 Pieri et al., 2002; Rose et al, 2003) . The analysis of Grindle & Burcham (2003) suggested that the aircraft sustained damage from a volcanic cloud that could only be detected with sophisticated instruments; the implication being that aircraft flying in volcanically active areas, without such instruments, are probably sustaining undetected damage on many occasions. Space precludes a proper discussion of the Hekla analyses here, but the incident highlights current uncertainty about the damage caused by volcanic ash in low concentrations, and the importance of investigation of every reported encounter.
Detection of volcanic eruptions
Aircraft in the vicinity need to know about volcanic eruptions immediately that ash is at cruising levels, with a five-minute desired notification time often quoted (eg Ellrod et al., 2002; Simpson et al., 2002; FAA, 2001) , based on the knowledge that an eruption cloud can reach cruising levels within five minutes of the eruption (FAA, 2001) . ICAO (2000) set no actual lead-time standards; warnings are presumed to go out as soon as possible, which in practice has been known to take hours. Examination of individual events can suggest pragmatic ways to increase warning responsiveness and refine the IAVW.
The ability of remote sensing and other observational techniques to provide adequate data to verify the extent of dispersion of ash clouds.
Techniques used for observing volcanic ash cloud dispersion are introduced in the next section; they have always been recognized as imperfect, and it is important to document as many cases as possible for the future development of the IAVW.
Purpose of this paper
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of remote sensing of volcanic ash in the western Pacific region, particularly during the extended GMS-5 ('Himawari') operations from 1995 to 2003. We present five cases that represent the more dangerous eruptions to have occurred in the region since 1995. We examine real-time satellite data used in meteorological operations, and also data normally available only for post-analysis. We describe a number of aircraft encounters with volcanic ash for these events, and we discuss the successes and failures of the IAVW for these events, focusing principally on remote sensing related issues.
Data and Methods

Data
We used GMS-5 Visible Infrared Spin-Scan Radiometer (VISSR) data and US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) data in High (1 km) Resolution Picture Transmission format from Bureau of Meteorology archives, AVHRR Local (1 km resolution) and Global (4 km) Area Coverage formats from the NOAA Satellite Active Archive (http://www.saa.noaa.gov/), and NASA Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer (TOMS) and Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) data. We sourced radiosonde observations from the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA), the Australian Bureau of Meteorology (BOM), NOAA, and the UK Met Office, and used numerical and manual meteorological analyses from JMA and the BOM Darwin Regional Specialised Meteorological Centre. To aid our analyses we variously used dispersion model output from HYSPLIT (Draxler & Hess, 1998) , the JMA 'Streamlined' Lagrangian volcanic ash dispersion model, and VAFTAD (Heffter & Stunder, 1993) output provided by the NOAA Air Resources Laboratory. We analyzed the infrared (IR) and visible satellite imagery using routines created in McIDAS 2002a (http://www.ssec.wisc.edu/software/mcidas.html) and ENVI 3.5 (http://www.rsinc.com/envi/).
Analysis of IR and visible imagery
For an overview of the use of remote sensing data in volcanology and volcanic cloud analysis, see Oppenheimer (1998) and . Two principal methods of satellite analysis for volcanic clouds are used in operational work, 'pattern analysis' and 'reverse' absorption. Pattern analysis is the basis of operational satellite meteorology, where skilled analysts diagnose the nature of cloud features using single band IR and visible imagery in combination with other meteorological observations, numerical modeling and theoretical knowledge. Sawada (1987) produced a definitive analysis of past eruptions in the region using this technique, and the UK Met Office has been progressively implementing an automatic eruption detection system based on pattern analysis principles (Watkin et al, 2003) .
The reverse absorption algorithm is described by Prata (1989 a,b) . The algorithm uses 11 µm and 12 µm brightness temperatures, to take advantage of the opposite absorption characteristics of water vapor or water/ice clouds and volcanic ash clouds at these wavelengths. Known limitations of the technique are summarized by , Simpson et al. (2000) and . For the cases presented here, the most relevant limitations are:
i)
The presence of substantial amounts of ice in ash cloud can partially or completely obscure the ash signal (Prata, 1989a; Rose et al., 1995) .
ii) Positive absorption from high amounts of water vapor (e.g. McMillin, 1975) can obscure the ash signal, an effect implicit in Prata (1989b) , and shown for a Pinatubo eruption in Potts (1993) . The effect can usually be detected using scatter diagram analysis , which Darwin VAAC performs in real-time operations.
iii) Storms of mineral dust are generated over the Australian continent and very frequently over China, and can be observed using IR data (Ackerman, 1997; Kinoshita et al., 1999; Murayama et al., 2001; Iino et al., 2003; Sokolik, 2002 Sokolik, , 2003 . Although dust can be discriminated from volcanic aerosols during the day using multi-spectral techniques (Higurashi & Nakajima, 2002) , there is some possibility of confusion between ash and dust using IR techniques only . Archives of reverse absorption imagery of dust storms from China during 1997-present are kept by the Kagoshima Kosa Analysis Group, http://arist.edu.kagoshima-u.ac.jp/adust/kosae/kosa-e.htm ; using these we have so far been unable to identify a major eruption and simultaneous dust storm for study.
iv)
False alarms from the technique can also occur in the presence of temperature inversions near the surface (Platt & Prata, 1993) , in stratospheric thunderstorm cloud tops (Potts & Ebert, 1996) , and in other circumstances summarized by .
Pattern analysis and reverse absorption are complementary techniques, since pattern analysis, which requires sufficient gradient in the scene to distinguish volcanic from meteorological clouds (Sawada, 1987) , works best for fresh, opaque eruption clouds clearly separated from other clouds, and reverse absorption requires the clouds to be semi-transparent and therefore usually in the dissipating stage. On this basis criticized the methodology employed by Simpson et al. (2000) , who defined a reverse absorption failure rate based on cloud identified using pattern analysis. In practice, pattern analysis and reverse absorption are used together to produce operational analyses.
The differing channel separation, resolution, central wavelengths and channel widths of the different sensors also affect the reverse absorption results obtained for both ash and dust (Tokuno, 2000; Sokolik, 2002 Sokolik, , 2003 . Potts & Tokuno (1999) suggested that the GMS-5/VISSR sensor was useful for volcanic ash detection despite its poorer resolution (5 km at nadir) and channel separation compared to the NOAA/AVHRR sensor, because of the much higher temporal resolution of GMS-5 (half to one hourly). Merchant et al (2003) compare well-calibrated ATSR-2 data to the less-well calibrated GMS-5 VISSR IR channels, while Koyama & Hillger (2003) show a low rate of degradation of the sensors during the period of interest. compare MODIS, VISSR, and AVHRR retrievals over the 2002 Ruang eruption.
The Tokyo and Darwin VAACs use different implementations of the reverse absorption algorithm. Tokyo VAAC uses 12-11 µm images stretched for contrast, with many examples given in JMA (2003) . Darwin VAAC uses 11-12 µm superimposed on an 11 µm image (for GMS/VISSR, labeled '∆T*/IR1' in this paper), to allow 'pattern analysis' on the same image. A simple despeckling filter reduces image noise, and the enhancement reduces 'false alarms' associated with high cloud tops (Potts & Ebert, 1996; by imposing a more negative threshold for the reverse absorption algorithm to identify possible ash at very cold temperatures:
where T is the derived IR brightness temperature for the relevant channels, ∆T = T (11 µm) -T (12 µm), and f and c are set empirically to correct for false alarms in cold thunderstorm tops and warm temperature / threshold problems respectively. In preparing this paper, we considered each case using the Tokyo and Darwin algorithm variations, experimented with values of c and f, and then chose to present each case using the Darwin enhancement with f =12.5 K (the operational default, empirically derived from Potts & Ebert (1996) ) and c=0 for all IR sensors. The difference between ∆T* and ∆T images was generally small except in the tropics, where the imagery was substantially improved through elimination of false alarms associated with very cold thunderstorm tops (Potts & Ebert, 1996; .
For each event, we prepared a temporal composite of all available VISSR ∆T*/IR1 images remapped to Mercator or Lambert Conformal projection, with the minimum ∆T* value during the period of the event shown at each point, and ∆T* values ≥ 0 excluded to aid clarity. This allows us to objectively determine the distance from the source for which each volcanic cloud gives a stronger reverse absorption signal than the maximum background 'noise'. There was some image-to-image variation in the overall ∆T*/IR1 magnitudes which we attribute to slight calibration or other quality control problems, and a few particularly 'noisy' and non-essential images were excluded from the composites; where the 'noise' has occurred during a critical phase of the eruption (for example, during the Miyakejima eruption), we retained all the data in the composite. We then annotated the composites with subjective analyses of the paths of all known volcanic clouds during the events.
Analysis of TOMS data
The TOMS instrument measures the albedo of the sunlit Earth at 6 ultraviolet (UV) wavelengths. Although designed to measure ozone (O 3 ) in the Earth's atmosphere, TOMS is also capable of mapping volcanic sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) clouds due to similarities between the UV absorption spectra of O 3 and SO 2 . The theoretical basis of the TOMS SO 2 retrieval algorithm is described by . TOMS UV radiance data are also used to produce an Aerosol Index (AI) that is sensitive to suspended matter, such as volcanic ash, smoke, dust and sulfate, in the atmosphere. The AI value is near zero in aerosol-free areas and for water clouds, and increases with aerosol optical depth and cloud altitude (Torres et al., 1998 Although TOMS data are usually available in near-real time through the World Wide Web, some of the events documented here were not fully analyzed at the time of each eruption but were re-analyzed for this paper. Along with SO 2 and AI data, TOMS O 3 data were also utilized, since they provide a means of distinguishing small amounts of SO 2 in otherwise indistinct volcanic clouds, owing to the similarities between SO 2 and O 3 referred to above. Volcanic SO 2 produces anomalous localized peaks in raw O 3 data, which can be identified as volcanic in origin when observed close to an erupting volcano since genuine O 3 rarely exhibits small-scale variations.
TOMS data has limited sensitivity in the lower troposphere; Sokolik (2002) questioned its value for monitoring mineral dust, which tend to be predominantly in the lowest few kilometers of the atmosphere. However, Simpson et al. (2003) used TOMS with a fair degree of success to track dust storms, and TOMS has been used successfully previously for volcanic cloud studies (eg Constantine et al., 2000; Krotkov et al., 1999) .
Case selection
The cases selected for analysis (Table 1) represent the more hazardous eruptions to have occurred recently in the region, across a wide range of meteorological conditions. Other volcanoes that were active during the period include Mayon (Philippines; JMA, 2003) and Ulawun (Papua New Guinea; . Major lower level eruptions also occurred at Ruapehu (New Zealand; Potts & Tokuno, 1999) and Sakurajima (Japan), which has also had continuous minor activity (Iino et al., 2001b) . Many volcanoes, such as Semeru (Java, Indonesia) or Suwanosejima (Japan), have been in a state of frequent low-level eruption, but the eruptions have often fallen below satellite resolution or have been completely obscured by cloud . 
Height of eruptions
Eruption height is a critical parameter because it determines the eventual distribution of the ash. Table  1 summarizes estimates of eruption height from various sources. It is often difficult to reconcile eruption heights reported from the ground with satellite-observed heights (Sawada, 2002) . Much of this can be attributed to the near-impossibility of making accurate height estimates of tall eruption clouds from observatories close to the volcano, as was possibly the case with the Ruang eruption considered here .
Volcanic cloud heights have been estimated by correlating IR brightness temperatures from opaque or near-opaque clouds with radiosonde soundings, by comparing cloud movement with atmospheric winds (Oppenheimer, 1998; Holasek et al., 1996) , and examining pilot reports. For Ruang, we used shadow measurement (Prata and Grant, 2001 ) on Aqua/MODIS data. For the Ruang GMS-5/VISSR data, we also used an approximate shadow height method suitable for operational use, which avoids parallax complications (Oppenheimer, 1998) by comparing the cloud shadow with the shadows of nearby tropospheric meteorological clouds.
Results
Shiveluch, 21-24 May 2001
Figure 1 summarizes the path of the Shiveluch eruption clouds, beginning at 0000 UTC on 21 May. Label A shows the path of the main ash cloud, produced from the 1309 UTC eruption on 21 May, and first visible on the 1337 UTC image (satellite times given are approximate overpass times). This ash cloud circled slowly over Kamchatka, before accelerating and moving to the southeast ahead of an intruding mid-latitude airmass, and became indistinct late on 24 May.
An area of minimum ∆T*s is located around D, close to the path of the dissipating cloud A. Analysis of earlier GMS animations (not shown) strongly suggests that this is residual ash from the earlier eruptions of 19 and 20 May, highlighting the complexity of ash clouds produced from eruptions with multiple explosive phases.
The main eruption cloud sheared with a portion (B) drifting to the southeast and then circling clockwise around the main body before becoming difficult to detect by 25 hours after the eruption. This cloud was more clearly visible on AVHRR and MODIS reverse absorption imagery than on VISSR. Ash from the 20 May 2013 UTC eruption also circled Kamchatka, at a slightly greater distance (C) and at an estimated height of 10-12 km. There are some areas of 'false alarms' in the -2 K < ∆T* < 0 K range. Visible imagery showed extensive areas of stratus, and temperature soundings confirm a low level inversion which, together with the relatively low precision of the data, was most likely responsible for the false alarms (Platt & Prata, 1993) .
The exceptional visibility conditions for this event make a closer examination of the cloud signature worthwhile. Figure 2 shows the coldest brightness temperature of the cloud over time, as well as the most negative ∆T within the cloud. The cloud was non-opaque from the first image, and the magnitude of ∆T increased over the next two hours as the cloud thinned further in parts. The decrease in brightness temperature as the cloud thinned in the first few hours after the eruption could reflect an increase in cloud height within the troposphere, but more likely indicates the thinning of a stratospheric cloud to show colder layers closer to the tropopause. From about 00 UTC on 22 May, twelve hours after the eruption, the cloud became impossible to track using single channel IR imagery, and its position was taken to be that of the strongest reverse absorption signal. The IR temperature shown after that point varies with the temperature of the underlying surface, as is evident from the 'spike' on 23 May as the cloud transited warm land during the day.
From Figures 1 and 2 , the time for which the reverse absorption imagery unambiguously tracked the main body of the ash cloud (with values clearly higher than background noise) was about 36 hours. Careful post-analysis of individual images shows the track continuing for approximately another 44 hours. For this eruption, with a dry atmosphere and no noteworthy water/ice clouds, a skilled analyst can potentially track the ash cloud for 12 hours using 'pattern analysis', and about 80 hours in total using the split window method with GMS-5 data only.
Figure 3 compares ∆Ts for VISSR and AVHRR data at 1537 UTC and 1547 UTC respectively on 21 May, and shows the relevant IR and IR/∆T* images. At this stage, the cloud was thinning and shearing, with the central portion still relatively opaque and giving near-zero ∆Ts (the ∆T* formulation used increases the ∆Ts in the IR/∆T* image centers by about 1K). The GMS-5 data are distorted due to parallax effects that are exaggerated with the height of the cloud, but overall the two sensors compare extremely well. The number of GMS points clustered just below the zero line on the scatter diagram reflects the lower resolution of the data, especially at high latitudes. An AI image from 2314 UTC on 21 May showed aerosols associated with cloud A, a weak signal corresponding to cloud C, and aerosols over northern Kamchatka which were not apparent on other imagery but which may be associated with earlier eruptions. A 0007 UTC pass from 22 May gives a similar result, confirming the presence of an ash cloud south of the volcano, and with aerosols again over northern Kamchatka. No TOMS images clearly detected ash after 22 May. The path of t ash trans from the Bezymian eruption is summarized Figure 4 . False alarm were, as for the Shiveluch eruption, associated with low level stratocumulus or clear air, but the ash cloud could be tracked unambiguously for about 30 hours.
Bezymianny, 6 -8 August 2001
The eruption started at 2328 UTC on 6 August (Smithsonian Institution, 2001b) . At 2338 UTC a GMS/VISSR image showed a small cloud with possible ash detected by the split-window image in the center. At 2345 UTC the eruption was observed to a height of 13 km above MSL. EP TOMS flew over the Bezymianny region at 2358 UTC on 6 August and AI data showed an aerosol signal at the location. The next TOMS overpass did not occur until 2312 UTC on 7 August, and showed no aerosol signal. Hence, TOMS missed the main period of cloud transport southwest towards the Kuriles although it was the first satellite sensor to clearly show the ash cloud. Again, no SO 2 was detected by TOMS for the event; in this case the unfavorable orbits and the mainly tropospheric altitude of the cloud may have affected detection. This case is notable because of the deformation of the cloud as it moved south during a period of polar/tropical airmass interaction, with lower level cloud moving more slowly and taking a more easterly track, and possibly some stretching deformation occurring as the flow accelerated. At maximum extent the cloud mass stretched 1700 km SSW of the eruption and almost to Hokkaido, effectively closing that airspace. An eastward 'turn' is evident at the southern extent of the ash cloud as the ash encountered the upper outflow from Typhoon 'Man-Yi', which was steadily moving northward and beginning to dissipate. After that point, observation of the now diffuse ash cloud was curtailed by it mixing with, or being obscured by, the cirrus shield associated with the storm outflow. Some ash would certainly have been carried eastwards across the Pacific.
Miyakejima, 18 -19 August 2000
The Miyakejima eruption was a considerably more complicated event than the preceding examples. Ground based observations of the event (radar, video, eye witness reports) are widely available, but satellite observation was limited by a relative lack of AVHRR passes over the eruption cloud, and by Terra/MODIS instrument failure during the 18th. Figure 5 is a temporal composite of GMS splitwindow data, with the approximate positions of the known aircraft encounters and the paths of the ash clouds indicated. Hourly VISSR reverse absorption images are shown by Iino et al (2001a) , Kinoshita et al (2003) and JMA (2003) .
At least five aircraft are known to have encountered the ash clouds (Table 2) , with at least two sustaining life-threatening damage (loss of electronic engine controls, loss of forward visibility), and total costs probably well over US $12 million. Four ash cloud tracks have been indicated on Figure 5 . Path A shows a strong, discrete ash signal that moved south-southwest at approximately 9 m/s and an altitude of above 15 km, becoming lost over the cloud of a developing low pressure system (which followed the path J) at 1840 UTC. The EP TOMS pass at 0221 UTC on 19 August showed a strong SO 2 signal near the area where this ash would be expected to be, suggesting high level SO 2 was associated with the ash.
Cloud B moved on a similar path but much more slowly. Comparison with upper winds suggests that this cloud was at levels of about 5-8 km, moving southwards at 4 m/s. Figure 6 is a comparison of the VISSR and MODIS split window products at 0040 and 0105 UTC on 19 August, showing the developing low and cloud B (green) as it moved south and was entrained into the low. The MODIS image is less noisy and shows slightly stronger ∆T*s than VISSR. Visible images from the same time show lower level eruptions from Miyakejima continuing, and moving westwards over Japan.
Cloud C (Fig. 5 ) moved southeast at about 25 m/s at levels of 9-11 km, corresponding to the cruising levels at which aircraft encounters at E and G ( Fig. 5 and Table 2 ) are known to have occurred. Detection of this cloud was initially hampered by some diffuse cirrus cloud from storms over Japan earlier in the afternoon, by the moist air into which the eruption occurred (similar to the case described by Simpson et al. (2002) ), and presumably also by water present in the phreatomagmatic eruption column (Rose et al., 1995) . However, weak ∆T*s of -1.5 to -2.0 K were visible in the plume until it moved over the developing low at 1230 UTC, which although 35 K warmer than the eruption cloud at that stage, presented a sufficiently cold background to inhibit detection ) when combined with the other factors. Subsequent imagery interpretation is highly subjective, and further complicated by scattered maritime cumulonimbus, associated with the developing low, penetrating the eruption cloud and presumably lofting some ash to higher levels. Cloud D appeared to be quite diffuse, with an altitude of about 8-9 km. Although the encounter at F occurred relatively close to the eruption and the observed phenomena indicated ash in the cloud, no damage was reported following the aircraft inspection.
An EP TOMS AI image from 0044 UTC on 19 August (not shown) had weak features corresponding with clouds C and D. The 0221 UTC overpass to the west of that area gives a strong ash signal clearly associated with cloud B, which probably contained the bulk of the aerosols from the eruption. The overall pattern of dispersion suggested by the TOMS AI images is similar to that predicted by HYSPLIT and VAFTAD output. Both dispersion models suggested a very wide area of ash dispersal to the southeast of, and over, Japan. However, poor temporal resolution and an apparent area of aerosols to the south-southeast of Kyushu limit interpretation of the TOMS AI images.
Many false alarms on the VISSR images appeared in or at the edges of cloud associated with the rapid intensification and passage of a sub-tropical low pressure system (J in Fig. 5 ), a decaying typhoon to the north (K), and cloud associated with an upper tropospheric disturbance (L). These false alarms were an issue when tracking clouds C & D because of the relatively low signal-to-noise ratio deriving from the factors described earlier.
Finally, lidars recorded aerosols on 23 August at Fukuoka and Nagoya (H and I respectively), at altitudes of 17.5 km and 16 km respectively (Smithsonian Institution, 2000) . Dispersion model outputs are quite consistent with high-level ash being advected over Japan some time after the eruption. Convective transport in the atmosphere (described earlier) could be responsible for lifting ash to 17.5 km, if the actual eruption did not attain that height. Table 3 presents a chronology of significant events during the initial phases of the eruption. We provide here a brief assessment of IAVW performance: 1) Encounters 1-4 occurred in areas where the volcanic clouds were well defined by pattern analysis (1-3) or reverse absorption (4), although the first two encounters occurred before the ingestion of the first image was completed. At this stage of the eruption, the eruption cloud and height was viewed by ground based observers, radar and pilots.
Factors contributing to the Miyakejima aircraft encounters
2) Warnings were issued relatively quickly, but at some stage, the communication processes broke down. Air traffic controllers appeared to be using a superseded advisory from Tokyo VAAC and diverted aircraft into the high-level ash cloud C. SIGMETs, the official warnings for international aviation, were not universally received, contained no forecast ash cloud tracks and insufficient height information, and were sometimes slower to be issued than the domestic ARMADs (Table 3 ). The process between identifying an eruption and issuing an appropriate SIGMET can be complex; Hufford et al. (2000) discuss issues relating to SIGMETs and volcanic ash clouds.
3) The encounters all happened to foreign airlines, which found it difficult to get reliable information. Domestic carriers had no encounters (N.Todo, JAL, personal communication) and their greater awareness of the state of the volcano enabled them to take appropriate evasive action.
4) Dispersion models forecast the ash over the location of encounter 5, but warnings had ceased for this area because the ash was no longer detectable; this is both a procedural and a remote sensing difficulty. Images from this eruption are also shown in , , and Davey et al. (2003) . The eruption began with a bifurcated plume between 3 and 5 km high, seen on visible imagery from 2240 UTC on 24 September, and drifting westwards at 5-8 m/s with weak ∆T*s and reaching location 'A' (Fig. 7) before being obscured by the main eruption cloud at 0545 UTC on the 25 th .
The main eruption had actually begun at 0340 UTC on the 25 th (Dali Ahmad, Indonesian Directorate of Volcanology and Geological Hazard Mitigation, personal communication). This eruption cloud was observed to split into four chief parts at altitudes above freezing level (4 km); Cloud B, in a deep layer between 5 and 14 km in height (encompassing aircraft cruising levels), drifted steadily west at 16 m/s in the middle to upper troposphere and gave a discernable ∆T* signal through to 2345 UTC on 26 September, when it was over Malaysia's Sarawak province, 1300 km west of Ruang and 44 hours after the main eruption. Cloud C was at about 14-16 km, just below the tropopause, in a layer moving southwest at 16 m/s. This cloud clearly contained ash and probably also contained a significant amount of ice, with a diffusing cirrus-like cloud faintly visible until about 2240 UTC on 25 September over southern Sulawesi (but little ∆T* signal).
Cloud D was probably mainly stratospheric, between 16 and 18 km, and drifted westwards at only about 2-3 m/s, remaining visible on VISSR ∆T*/IR1 imagery until approximately 1945 UTC on 26 September, 40 hours after the main eruption. The split window signal for this cloud was strong (∆T* < -5.5 K). We postulate that the core of the eruption cloud contained relatively little water, and that substantial amounts of ash penetrated into the dry stratosphere. Further work to explore the microphysical evolution of the cloud is planned.
Interestingly, MODIS ∆T*s for D (but not B) were consistently of a smaller magnitude than the equivalent GMS images (Figure 8 ) or AVHRR images . Multispectral images using the MODIS 8.4-8.7 µm and 7.2-7.5 µm bands indicate a strong SO 2 content in cloud D but not in the lower clouds ; the different instrument responses for 11/12 µm for cloud D suggest that the relatively narrow MODIS 10.8-11.3 µm and 11.8-12.3 µm channels are less sensitive to non-ash components than their broader VISSR and AVHRR equivalents. Again, this possibility will be the subject of further investigation. 
or use
Finally, cloud E moved eastwards in the stratosphere at about 16 m/s, at between 18 and approximately 22 km in height. The cloud gave no ash signal using any technique and is seen only as a faintly distinguishable cloud on IR imagery until 1040 UTC on 25 September, before it was advected above thunderstorm cloud tops over Halmahera. SO 2 anomalies apparently associated with clouds D and E were detected with Global Ozone Monitoring Experiment (GOME) imagery in the New Guinea area from 26 until 28 September (University of Bremen, http://www-iup.physik.uni-bremen.de/gomenrt/). We assume Cloud E was mainly gaseous with only trace amounts of ash.
EP TOMS data for the eruption was limited by inter-orbit data gaps, inevitable from a single polar orbiting satellite over an equatorial eruption. Cloud B was well detected on EP TOMS AI imagery over eastern Kalimantan at 0347 UTC on 26 September, with another area of aerosols over southwestern Kalimantan thought to be associated with biomass burning. Clouds D and E were initially not observed due to data gaps, and no SO 2 was observed moving eastward over the next few days. We believe that this reflects GOME's higher sensitivity to small SO 2 amounts despite a relatively large footprint.
Operationally, in addition to the relatively strong remote sensing performance, Ruang was the first major Indonesian eruption where eruption information was relayed to the VAAC before the eruption climax. A negative aspect was that no SIGMETs were received from the relevant Meteorological Watch Office, so some airlines continued to fly through the affected areas. The stratospheric cloud E was not identified in real-time and airlines flew underneath it; even though it was far higher than cruising levels and probably contained little ash, many airlines prefer to avoid this situation because of the possible fallout from the cloud (G.Rennie, Qantas, personal communication). Air traffic controllers relied on Volcanic Ash Advisories for airspace management and the diffusing tropospheric ash clouds caused considerable disruption as they approached Jakarta and Singapore. Although no aircraft encounters with volcanic ash were reported, this disruption alone would have caused millions of dollars in extra costs for the aviation industry. Langila and Rabaul, 8 -14 February 1997 Manam, Langila and Rabaul were active for most of February 1997, with regular post-event reports received for the three volcanoes from Rabaul Volcano Observatory (RVO), and real-time pilot reports received for the Langila eruptions. Observations of all kinds were affected by the extent of convective activity.
Manam,
Volcanic ash could not be definitely identified using reverse absorption imagery during February 1997 using GMS or AVHRR data, despite frequent explosive eruptions from these volcanoes. The ∆T*/IR1 VISSR composite (not shown) displayed a number of false alarms resulting from channel misalignment ), but little else of interest. Pattern analysis of IR and visible imagery identified two or possibly three eruptions in post-analysis with comparison to ground and pilot reports, but not in real-time. TOMS SO 2 , Ozone, and AI images were more effective, although limited by the low data frequency. Figure 9a shows an eruption plume from Manam, first identified in non real-time ground reports and then found in GMS IR imagery and TOMS data (Fig. 9b) during post analysis. On GMS IR animations, the eruption was first visible at 1145 UTC on 8 February, and was traceable only for a few hours. ADEOS and EP TOMS ozone data indicated SO 2 from the eruption dispersing westwards the next day at 0047 UTC and 0136 UTC respectively. Ground reports described strong eruptive activity to 7 km, between 0610 UTC and 1730 UTC on 8 February, with dark ash laden clouds blown south by low level winds. IR temperatures suggest a height of about 16 km (i.e., close to the tropopause) during the night. This height would have been virtually impossible to estimate accurately from the ground, and especially at night . Rabaul also erupted on 8 February, reported to 7 km height by ground observers (Smithsonian Institution, 1997). Deep convection formed over Rabaul during the afternoon and persisted for longer than usual, but this cannot be definitely attributed to the eruptions. No records are available of the timing of explosions from Rabaul on that day (Ima Itikarai, RVO, personal communication, 2003) .
ADEOS TOMS AI imagery showed an aerosol maximum just west of Manam on 10 February at 0020 UTC (Fig. 9e) and an ADEOS TOMS O 3 image indicated areas of SO 2 on the 11 th at 0134 UTC, with maxima east and west of Manam and over southern Papua New Guinea. Ground reports for this period were of continuous gray to dark ash-laden clouds to 7 km height from Manam, ash clouds to 5 km from Langila, and to 2 km from Rabaul. No ash clouds were identifiable on GMS or NOAA imagery during this period.
Figs. 9c and 9d show an eruption from Langila, on 12 February, and the location of a subsequent aircraft encounter (Table 2) . show a GMS-5 visible image from this eruption, which appears identical to nearby thunderstorm cloud. During the 12 th , pilots reported a 'solid core of discernable ash to 8km, ash plume of tight radius' (0630 UTC) from Langila, and ash 'more than 8 km in height' (0816 UTC). Ground observers reported eruption heights to 10 km from Langila, 4 km from Manam, and 2 km from Rabaul. Backward trajectories and post-analyzed charts suggest Langila as the most likely source for the ash from the encounter, but are not conclusive as the expected trajectory from Langila was north of the position of the encounter. No ash or SO 2 was detected in the vicinity of the encounter by any method.
Finally, ADEOS TOMS detected aerosols southwest of Langila, and far to the northwest, at 0014 UTC on 14 February (Fig. 9 f) . Reports from RVO around this time indicate ash to 5 km at Langila on the 13 th , and to 4 km at Rabaul and 3 km at Manam on the 14 th .
We scrutinized scatter diagrams for all available NOAA and GMS data during this period , and found no evidence for positive ∆Ts from water vapor obscuring negative ∆Ts from unglaciated ash cloud. Some scatter diagrams for the Langila plumes may show mixed ash and water/ice characteristics, but the data are ambiguous. If we exclude the unlikely circumstance that eruptions from all three volcanoes contained unusually high amounts of water (Rose et al, 1995) , then the poor detection can be presumed due to a combination of obscuration by overlying cloud, and glaciation from water/ice entrained from the moist atmosphere.
Discussion
Eruption detection issues
The high temporal resolution of geostationary satellites has been very important in the development of the IAVW. Had no ground based observations been available, all eruptions described herein, apart from those of Manam, Langila and Rabaul, could have been detected on the first available image using either pattern recognition or reverse absorption. The exceptions from Papua New Guinea are important; a reliable eruption detection system cannot be dependent on the meteorological conditions and it is necessary to have a weather-independent warning capacity. At the time of writing, groundbased monitoring of Langila has ceased (Wally Johnson, Geoscience Australia, personal communication), and monitoring activity at Manam has been rendered extremely difficult because of resource and socio-political issues .
A strong benefit of ground-based seismic observations is that they can be used for eruption prediction, and it is thus possible to implement conservative aircraft routing strategies and develop contingency plans to ensure a robust crisis response. The confusion at Miyakejima illustrates this perfectly; foreign airlines had little pre-eruption information and suffered from an imperfect, reactive warning system despite the fast initial reaction time, while local airlines, who had detailed contingency plans and better information flow, were able to operate safely. That this extremely dangerous situation occurred in one of the world's most technologically advanced and volcanically aware countries, should serve as an illustration of the progress yet to be made in the IAVW and a forewarning of the likely performance of the system in other parts of the world.
We believe that ground-based detection, through seismic, infrasonic and other monitoring, is essential for the development of a robust IAVW. While this is a daunting task for remote volcanoes, it is not impossible; for example it is expected that by 2004, 31 of the 43 historically active and remote Aleutian volcanoes will have seismic monitoring (Marianne Guffanti, U.S. Geological Survey, personal communication). Moreover, our experiences are that ground-based observations, clearly and quickly communicated, greatly improve the value to the IAVW of remote sensing observations by giving certainty to the fact of the eruption. However, if these data are not robustly integrated into IAVW procedures, further Miyakejima-type situations are inevitable.
Performance of remote sensing techniques for volcanic cloud monitoring
Pattern Analysis
Single IR and visible channel pattern analysis cannot be used alone to support the IAVW. For those situations where reverse-absorption monitoring is ineffective but the eruption is still seen on imagery, the length of time for which ash cloud can be inferred from pattern analysis is shorter than the IAVW requires. Once dense and cold cloud tops become transparent, and albedo features are weakened as the heavier particles drop out of the ash cloud, it can be very difficult to track volcanic ash cloud with any confidence. Detection periods usually range from about 2 to 12 hours after the eruption. The results here are consistent with the extensive work of Sawada (1987) .
The Reverse Absorption Technique
GMS-5/VISSR data were highly useful for volcanic monitoring
These cases verify the assertion of Potts & Tokuno (1999) that the high frequency of the GMS-5/VISSR data would be valuable for volcanic cloud monitoring in the region, even though the AVHRR and MODIS data has better spatial and temperature resolution. For each event, there were variations in image quality, especially from the polar orbiting satellites where the ∆T*s and image clarity depended on how favorable each orbit was for observing the eruption. Overall, the VISSR ∆T*s were close to the AVHRR and MODIS data. For eruptions of this size, the high frequency of receipt of GMS/VISSR data far outweighs the poorer spatial resolution of the satellite and the 'noise' resulting from relatively low data precision.
False alarm and probability of detection issues
False alarms in these cases were generally associated with poor data precision and/or calibration (for VISSR), and with cloud or clear air under inversions in the troposphere. For the Bezymianny, Shiveluch and Ruang cases, the good signal-to-noise ratio permitted extensive tracking of the majority of ash clouds. For some of the Miyakejima clouds and one of the Ruang clouds, the signal was sufficiently reduced by the inhibiting factors described in the text for ash/noise discrimination to be an issue. The eruptions from Papua New Guinea presumably had ice-dominant cloud tops and no detectable ash signal using reverse absorption. The inhibiting factor of positive ∆T*s from high water vapor loading appeared to have the beneficial side effect of reducing the level of false alarms, especially for the Ruang case. This was difficult to evaluate for the Miyakejima case, where the atmosphere was also moist, because the VISSR data was particularly noisy.
Eruptions and moist convection
Eruption clouds exist on a spectrum between the 'volcanic thunderstorm' (Oswalt et al. 1996 ) and a volcanic cloud relatively unaffected by environmental interactions. In the moist tropics, we would expect that entrainment of water vapor and the higher tropopause will increase the height of maximum ascent of otherwise small to moderate sized eruptions, resulting in high eruption clouds with high water vapor but relatively less ash (Graf et al., 1999; Woods, 1993) , and therefore a proportionally lower chance of detection than an eruption of the same height at high latitudes. Rabaul Volcano Observatory has observed convective growth over small eruptions in Papua New Guinea (Ima Itikarai, personal communication, 2002) , and show large cumulus forming over passive degassing in a moist environment at Sakurajima, Japan.
From the satellite perspective, eruptions of Manam on 5 October1998, and of Ulawun on 30 April 2001, were very similar to the Papua New Guinea cases presented here, with a cloud ascending close to the tropopause, SO 2 clearly detected by TOMS, but no ash found with the split-window algorithm. These eruptions may be regarded as circumstantial evidence of enhanced volcanic cloud height through radial entrainment, but much more work needs to be done on the subject.
Another result of the convective process is that 'masking' cloud can form at the top of the ash cloud, either as a pileus cloud during rapid ascent or as a cirrus anvil over a mature, deep cloud, and obscure the ash present in the cloud below. Hoblitt et al. (1996) show photographs of pre-paroxysmal eruptions of Pinatubo where this effect is noticeable. Cumulonimbus anvils are usually persistent for several hours after thunderstorm formation, well after the rest of the cloud has dissipated, and form an effective barrier to satellite monitoring.
Enough eruptions have been recorded in Papua New Guinea in recent years to show that application of current operational techniques is very difficult. If it were not for the exceptional work of the Rabaul Volcano Observatory and the equally important pilot reports from Air Niugini and other airlines, then many, if not most, eruptions would have been completely undetected.
Future improvements in IR detection
Although the limiting effect described earlier will remain, IR detection is still likely to improve. Tokuno (2000) shows how split-window detection with MTSAT can be expected to give stronger ∆Ts than GMS-VISSR and NOAA-AVHRR satellites. The data precision will also be higher, which will result in less background noise, and the capacity to perform 'fine-tuning' such as water vapor corrections. The net effect of these improvements will be to reliably sense more of each ash cloud, and to sense the ash clouds to a greater distance and time from their source. In addition, the availability of a 3.7 µm channel on MTSAT will enable implementation of 3-channel techniques (Ellrod et al, 2003) to better detect volcanic clouds, as well as further research into improved uses of short-wave IR channels for future satellite sensors.
New multi-channel radiometers (e.g. MODIS, GLI, SEVIRI) offer interesting possibilities for improved volcanic ash detection. A channel near 8.6 µm can be used to detect ash when used in combination with a second longer wavelength channel, and can also be used to identify low level SO 2 (Realmuto et al., 1994) . Prata et al (2003a, b) and Rose et al. (2003) have recently shown that 7.3 µm channel can be used to quantitatively measure the SO 2 column abundance in the upper troposphere/lower stratosphere. Such data have been routinely available since 1979 from the HIRS family of instruments, on board the NOAA satellites. These new channels for ash/SO 2 detection are available on MODIS and SEVIRI. The AIRS instrument on board the Aqua platform offers another exciting possibility for ash/SO 2 detection. This instrument provides more than 2000 channels, with key ash/SO 2 channels situated around 4, 7.3, 8.4 µm and in the 10-13 µm window. Carn et al. (2002) have compared IR SO 2 retrievals with TOMS. The great utility of these new IR techniques is that they complement the well-established UV methods (e.g. TOMS and GOME) and they fill the nighttime SO 2 measurement gap.
TOMS and GOME data
Despite the low data frequency, TOMS AI, SO 2 and O 3 products have significantly added to the analysis of these events. In particular, the ability of TOMS to detect aerosols and SO 2 near and above the top of moist tropical cloud masses has great potential for operational use. Meteor-3 TOMS AI and SO 2 images also enabled tracking of the 1994 Rabaul eruption cloud for several days, despite the seawater interaction that prevented observation with the reverse absorption technique (Rose et al., 1995) .
The most obvious way to expand the use of this type of data is to mount a UV TOMS-like instrument on a geostationary platform. Unfortunately, recent proposals to trial this configuration have been unsuccessful, perhaps due to the night-time data gap. However, based on the events studied here, and particularly the eruptions in Papua New Guinea, which lies in the region of the warmest sea surface temperatures, most moist air and greatest high cloud cover in the world, the daytime data collected would more than justify the launch of such an instrument. Similar conditions are prevalent in Indonesia, the Solomon Islands and the Philippines for most of the year.
Part of the value of TOMS is its capacity to simultaneously sense ash and SO 2 , although both are subject to false alarms from other sources. SO 2 data are not yet widely used in the IAVW, because of the delay in obtaining the data, and because the focus of the system is on volcanic ash. However, if the data were available frequently and in real-time, it could be used directly in volcanic ash warnings by making one reasonable assumption: the presence of SO 2 near a known eruption should imply at least trace levels of ash at the level of the SO 2 , and, for a high level SO 2 cloud, significant quantities of ash dispersing at lower levels.
This assumption is certainly valid for the latter three events examined here, and is consistent with other studies (eg Constantine et al., 2000) . Ellrod et al. (2002) point out that SO 2 is a recognized source of aviation damage in its own right. Hence SO 2 detection should form part of operational IAVW procedures, and may, when combined with dispersion model analysis, provide a partial solution to the obscuration of lower level ash by cloud.
A holistic approach to volcanic cloud detection
It is quite clear from the cases considered here that there remains a high potential for an aviation tragedy as a result of a volcanic eruption. This might result from human error, data sparseness, communication problems, dispersion model problems, or weaknesses in remote sensing. In all likelihood, it would result from a combination of a number of these factors. Constantine et al. (2000) , comparing TOMS and AVHRR data for the eruption of Cerro Hudson in 1991, asserted that each detector has advantages that apply in different environmental conditions, and that each should be used in a (partially) 'redundant but complementary volcanic-cloud mitigation effort'. We affirm this view. We also assert that more work needs to be done overall on the IAVW. We strongly advocate a holistic approach to ash detection and warning, which recognizes the advantages and drawbacks of the various technologies outlined in this paper. These will include automated satellite detection, meteorological analyses, pilot reports, dispersion modeling, seismic and other geophysical pre-and post-eruptive data, and ground-based measurements (e.g. observers' reports, earthquake data, web-cam information). We advocate the use of new methods alongside existing techniques and expect that in the near future on board detection instruments will be available as well as operational ground-based IR cameras providing real-time volcanic ash/SO 2 imagery.
Conclusions
We have examined the ability of all available data to describe the dispersion of volcanic clouds in the western Pacific region during five major events involving eruptions from eight volcanoes to or above the cruising level of aircraft on international routes. We show: a) No single method of observation or satellite sensor is able to identify and track volcanic clouds in every case. The principal limitations affecting detection are the presence of meteorological cloud obscuring eruptions, or of substantial amounts of ice in volcanic clouds. In cloudy conditions, one cannot sufficiently monitor volcanic clouds using remote sensing alone. Two of the six aircraft encounters described occurred in conditions where the volcanic cloud could not be clearly identified by remote sensing.
b) Currently, the best method for discriminating dispersing volcanic ash clouds from water/ice clouds is the reverse absorption, or split-window technique. We were able to track one eruption cloud in this study for 80 hours using this technique on GMS-5/VISSR imagery. c) Hourly animation of GMS-5/VISSR reverse absorption images provided better tracking of volcanic clouds than using NOAA/AVHRR and (single channel) GMS-4/VISSR data combined.
d) TOMS data showed skill in detecting volcanic SO 2 or ash at the top of volcanic clouds not well detected with the reverse-absorption technique. A TOMS-like instrument on a geostationary platform would be a valuable tool for operational volcanic cloud sensing. Better use can be made of SO 2 data for implying the existence of ash.
e) The enhancement of complementary ground-based observations, and careful collaboration between meteorological and volcanological agencies is necessary because of the certainty of overlying cloud inhibiting remote sensing observations in many future eruptions, and because of the added value of ground-based predictive techniques.
